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Is Modernism Really Modern?
Uncovering a Fallacy in Postmodernism
Abstract

Some postmodernists criticize the view that the logics of Western thought can be
employed universally. In doing so, they assume without adequate proof that different human
societies have greatly different rationalities and employ completely different logics. This essay
argues that, on the contrary, widely different cultures often share noteworthy similarities in
rationality.
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Is Modernism New?
Uncovering a Fallacy in Postmodernism

Different authors construe modernism and postmodernism in different ways. Some
postmodernists take a Marxist perspective; others do not. Some ponder about value issues, some
on societal issues, and others on logical questions. A number of postmodernists believe that the
methods of logic and argumentation taught by Eurocentric scholars are the creation of a
particular milieu, which they call “modernism” or “modernity,” and do not apply in diverse
societies. Accordingly, postmodernists sometimes put forward the idea that patterns of reasoning
vary dramatically across time, place, and culture. This view has influenced the theory of
argumentation, including the work of Willard, Brummett, and others.1 This essay offers
anthropological evidence that such a claim is significantly exaggerated.
The claim that methods of thinking and argumentation are greatly different in various
societies is not a philosophical assertion. It is an empirical claim. It is subject to confirmation or
falsification by observations of various societies. As Gill (1994) points out, many attacks against
postmodernism2 have proven vulnerable to the postmodernists‟ response that their critics are
“informed by outmoded narratives of logic and metaphysics” (p. 206). In other words, previous
critiques of postmodernist theories may employ modernist assumptions, and thus argue in a
circle. This essay, however, questions not the postmodernists‟ conclusions, but rather an

Is Modernism Really Modern?

4

assumption that some of them make, and does so from a point of view that is sensitive to culture
and tradition.
The Postmodernist Theory of Modernity
The postmodernist theory of modernity takes different forms in the hands of different
authors, but the basic idea often goes something like the following.
Modernism, many postmodernists claim, arose during the Renaissance or Enlightenment
in Europe. Modernism implies a reliance on logical forms of discourse and linear modes of
thinking. Modernism, the story goes, attempts to impose a certain kind of logical standard on the
diverse modes of thinking of different eras and peoples.
The key building block is the claim that different societies use much different methods of
argumentation, no one of which has prima facie more merit than any other. Rorty (1979) is often
favorably cited for his view that rationality is tied to culture and historicity. He provocatively
suggests a new approach to philosophy in which “Our focus shifts from the relation between
human beings and the objects of their inquiry to the relation between alternative standards of
justification” (pp. 389-390). He further suggests that it is pointless to look for a universal way to
examine the functions of knowledge “and that cultural anthropology (in a large sense which
includes intellectual history) is all we need” (Rorty, 1979, p. 381).
Rorty‟s view assumes that there exist in human societies significantly different and
incommensurable methods of rational thought. Similarly, in his critique of modernity, Toulmin
(1990) complains that, in the “„modern‟ age,” “the modes of life and thought in modern Europe
from 1700 on (modern science and medicine, engineering and institutions) were assumed to be
more rational than those typical of medieval Europe, or those found in less developed societies
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and cultures today” (Toulmin, 1990, p. 11). Toulmin contends further that “it was assumed that
uniquely rational procedures exist for handling the intellectual and practical problems of any
field of study, procedures which are available to anyone who sets superstition and mythology
aside” (Toulmin, 1990, p. 11). In her textbook on rhetorical theory, Gill characterizes
postmodernism as rejecting “the flawed nature of Western reason. In rejecting that reason,
postmodernism celebrates heterogeneity” (Gill, 1994).
The evidence of modern ethnographic research is that the similarities in how people
think, speak, and behave rationally are substantial. One feature that may sometimes lead one
astray is the obvious fact that different peoples do hold dramatically different beliefs and
opinions on many subjects, but this is mostly because they have had different experiences and
possess different information. In his important examination of the traditions related to medicinal
herbs and nutritional habits in various pre-industrial societies, Johns concludes that many
populations form dramatically different opinions about what causes illness and how illness
should be treated. He also finds, however, that “the intellectual methods by which humans
process the information do not vary significantly” (Johns, 1990, p. 279).
This illustrates how the very diversity of human societies, ideology, and behavior may
easily lead us to the questionable inference that we think in radically different ways. The content
of different societies may include widely different beliefs and social practices. Geertz (2000), for
example, argues in favor of several kinds of relativism in anthropological research. He explains
that what “relativists want us to worry about is provincialism.” We should not allow the
limitations “of our own society” to limit our thinking. This is certainly a valid concern, and to
support it Geertz cites the wide varieties of social practices in different societies (pp. 42-46). This
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does not, however, prove (nor does Geertz claim otherwise) that the members of different
societies think and reason in greatly dissimilar ways. This line of reasoning shows that scholars
should be open to the possibility of diversity. However, scholars should also be open to the
possibility of similarity.
Modernism Was Never Modern
The misleading notion is that the group of ideas and attitudes called modernism was a
creation of the European Renaissance, or of Aristotle, or what have you. Actually, much of the
sort of rationality that is alleged to be modernist is widespread among many cultures and
historical eras, including many pre-industrial societies. Logical, discursive thinking, deductive
and inductive forms, syllogistic thinking, and hypothesis formation and hypothesis testing have a
prominent place in numerous societies. (This is not to say that all people are adept at solving
problems in propositional logic, which would claim too much.) Let us look at some of the
empirical evidence for this thesis.
Culture and Evolution
Human cultures exist for a simple natural reason, which is that one human being, having
been able to acquire some important item of knowledge or some useful behavior, is able to
transmit it to his or her offspring, acquaintances, and pupils. Trial and error learning can be very
expensive in terms both of time and of risk. The cultural transmission of information and
behaviors enables people to learn more quickly, easily, and safely, thus gaining the benefits of
new knowledge with a minimal investment by the individual learner. The other side of the coin is
that human beings are great imitators, prepared by natural selection to acquire ideas and
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behaviors from others (Boyd & Richardson, 1985, pp. 4-15; Handwerker, 1989). This feature of
human life has brought a benefit to our species in its struggle to survive and reproduce.
Human beings quite likely have inherited “genetic propensities” to obtain knowledge and
analyze information. The possession of reliable information about an organism‟s environment
can have positive survival value (Wuketits, 1995, p. 361; Hahlweg & Hooker, 1989, p. 28).
Furthermore, in human beings the mechanisms for obtaining knowledge are in large part cultural
(Boyd & Richardson, 1985, 1992; Ruse, 1989, pp. 188-189). Thus, all human societies require
the ability to analyze their environment with reasonable accuracy.
In general, the ways in which people reason may be similar in different societies. LeviStrauss (1963) suggests that “the kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of
modern science.” He believes that “the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual
process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied” (p. 230). As anthropologist Ward
Goodenough (1990) puts it:

My own experience and that of others who have lived and worked intimately with
what used inappropriately to be called “primitive” people, learning to speak their
language and to communicate with them in their terms, is that these people draw
analogies and make deductive inferences in ways thoroughly familiar to us.
(Goodenough, 1990, p. 607)

“Logic begins,” Goodenough continues, “with the mapping of our experiences of things and
relationships into words and with generalizations about relationships that can be rendered into
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propositions” (Goodenough, 1990, p. 607). Logic, in other words, came into being as a tool for
human beings to adapt to and survive in varying new environments.
Syllogistic Reasoning: A Look at the Research in Ethno-Logic
Hamill (1990), a leading researcher in ethno-logic, writes that the syllogism has been
found in every society in which it has been looked for. Hamill argues that “The structure of
categorical reasoning is the same regardless of language or culture” (p. 103). People in different
societies derive valid conclusions from syllogisms. The patterns of syllogistic reasoning in all
cultures vary from those taught in logic manuals because no culture interprets “some” the way a
logic manual does. Contrary to logic manuals, in all natural languages (including English)
“some” means “both „there is one‟ and „there is not one‟” (Hamill, 1990, p. 103). However,
categorical syllogisms in all cultures in which syllogistic reasoning has been studied share similar
structures, or can be interpreted by the propositional calculus. As Hamill (1990) points out, “The
syllogism is a logical pattern found in every language and culture researched thus far” (p. 16).
Different societies have different stores of premises and accept different categorical statements as
being true, but the conclusions are drawn in structurally similar ways (Hamill, 1990, p. 104).3
Similarly, not all societies interpret “or” in the same way as propositional logic (where “or”
means “at least one”), so that it functions as a different logical operator in many societies than it
does in propositional logic.
Working among the Trobriand Islanders, Hutchins (1980) arrived at the conclusion that
culture does become involved in the formal aspects of problem solving. He also concluded,
however, that “a model of folk logic developed from purely western sources is quite adequate as
an account of the spontaneous reasoning of Trobriand Islanders” (p. 127). The reasoning of
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Trobriand islanders differs from “Aristotelian logic, because it contains plausible as well as
strong inferences, but then so does our own reasoning” (p. 127). Hutchins (1980) continues that
“The clear difference between cultures with respect to reasoning is in the representation of the
world which is thought about rather than in the processes employed in doing the thinking” (pp.
127-128).
In a study of the Navajo, Hamill (1990) concluded that “Consultants considered the same
kinds of arguments valid and invalid, and in no case did they draw conclusions that were invalid
according to the rules of textbook logic.” He did offer the qualifying conclusion that
“Consultants rejected several arguments that logicians consider valid; all of these involved
particular statements for which the corresponding universal statement was true (e.g., „Some oaks
are trees‟)” (p. 61). These results suggest a degree of commonality between the folk logic of the
Navajo and the textbook logic of European and American academics.
The Argument from Authority
No one could be surprised to encounter arguments from authority in non-industrial
societies. It is interesting to find that the Bearlaker hunter-gatherers employ the argument from
authority in a way that reminds us of the relevant chapters in any good argumentation or informal
logic textbook.
In his study of these people, Rushforth (1992) found that they prefer to learn things for
themselves. They value firsthand observation over other means of learning, which might surprise
a postmodernist who believes that pre-industrial societies devalue empirical knowledge. When
they rely on authority, Bearkakers strongly prefer to seek knowledge from persons who do have
direct experience on the matter in question. Furthermore, the Bearlakers do not transfer expertise
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in one field to expertise in another. To a Western logician, a physician has expert knowledge only
in medicine (see Kahane, 1992, pp. 28-34 for a modern logician‟s very similar analysis of
argument from authority). To a Bearlaker, a hunter‟s expertise does not translate into expertise
about fishing. The Bearlakers criticize as proud anyone who claims knowledge that is not based
on primary experience. The stress on primary experience furthers the Bearlakers‟ egalitarian
society, but it also clearly distinguishes between persons whose knowledge is based on
experience and those whose knowledge is not based on experience.
In his research among the Fang of Africa, Boyer (1990) discovered that opinions offered
as expert judgments are expected to be true, and that it is a violation of the people‟s standards for
a person claiming expertise to offer untrue information. People attend carefully to expert opinion,
discussing it even after the event in question is long past (p. 33).
Hypothesis Testing: Not a “Modern” Idea
Over thirty years ago, anthropologist William S. Laughlin (1968) pointed out that hunting
and gathering—the evolutionary human way of life—“has placed a premium upon inventiveness,
upon problem solving, and has imposed a real penalty for failure to solve the problem” (p. 304).
It should surprise us very much if members of societies living in anything resembling the
primeval manner lack reliable methods of investigating problems.
To be more precise, pre-industrial peoples are not imitating science; it might be fairer to
say that scientists developed their methods using universal, primeval methods of thought as their
starting point. The Harvard research team‟s studies of the !Kung San of the Kalahari merits our
attention because these people earn the bulk of their sustenance by hunting and gathering in the
African savanna, where they rely on the flora and fauna of humanity‟s ancestral home. It would
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certainly overstate the case to claim that the San are an uncontaminated relic of primeval human
culture (Lee, 1992); however, their way of life may provide the closest modern simulation of
primeval life (Solway & Lee, 1990). In any case, the !Kung San differ substantially from the
culture of European modernism. Yet, we find that their manner of reasoning and arguing parallels
the structure and methods of modern scientific thought.
Blurton Jones and Konner (1976) note that the !Kung San possess a naturally inquisitive
turn of mind that leads them to acquire knowledge of animals for the sheer pleasure of holding
that knowledge. Yet, this knowledge has practical application. The reasoning that the !Kung San
follow during a hunt seeks solutions to a series of questions: “Where is the animal now? Which
way is it going, and how fast? Is it likely to stop or to reverse direction? Where and how
seriously is it wounded? How long will it live?” (Blurton Jones & Konner, 1976, p. 342). In
answering these questions, the San hunter relies on a resource of prior knowledge of animal
behavior. During a typical hunt, the hunter forms “a working hypothesis” about the animals‟
location and behavior “and then tested continually against the spoor” (Blurton Jones & Konner,
1976, p. 342). Blurton Jones and Konner give a number of interesting examples of this sort of
thinking; for example, one hunter was following a gemsbok trail that he claimed to have been
made earlier in the day. However, the hunter abandoned the chase when he discovered a mouse
footprint inside the gemsbok‟s footprint: “Since mice are nocturnal, the gemsbok print must have
been left during the night” (Blurton Jones & Konner, 1976, p. 342). The anthropologists‟
insightful conclusion is that:
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Such an intellective process is familiar to us from detective stories and indeed also
from science itself. Evidently it is a basic feature of human mental life. It would be
surprising indeed if repeated activation of hypotheses, trying them out against new data,
integrating them with previously known facts, and rejecting ones which do not stand up,
were habits of mind peculiar to western scientists and detectives. . . . That they are
brought to impressive fruition by the technology of scientists and the leisure of novelists
should not be allowed to persuade us that we invented them. (Blurton Jones & Konner,
1976, p. 343)4

Observation of the Hadza of Tasmania, a present-day hunting and gathering group, establishes a
similar pattern of observational analysis and decision-making. The Hadza scavenged game based
on such evidence as animal sounds and observations of predator behavior (O‟Connell & Hawkes,
1988, p. 117). The analyses of the !Kung San and Hadza are consistent with Atran‟s (1990)
finding that numerous human societies name and organize species taxonomically in ways that are
at least roughly analogous to those of European biology (p. 17).
Conclusion
Syllogism, deductive logic, inductive logic, the argument from authority, empirical
observation, and hypothesis testing are widespread in diverse human societies. They are even
found in cultures that share features in common with Pleistocene hunter and gatherers. When
some postmodernists argue that these basic patterns of human reasoning and discourse are the
products of European thought, they claim on behalf of European society what is actually the
property of humankind.
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Postmodernists often contend that people of other times and places need not be bound by
the strictures of this uniquely “European” style of thinking and speaking. An analogy illustrates
why this is a fallacy. Suppose that a European or American scholar were to note that all modern
Westerners breathe in a certain way and value a certain way of breathing. Suppose that this
philosopher then claimed that modernist Western breathers invented this method of breathing.
Nonetheless, this mythical philosopher argues, we should not assert the rightness of the Western
way of breathing and should acknowledge that other peoples have every right to breathe in their
own manner.
This is, more or less, how postmodernists sometimes think. Neither Aristotle nor the
Renaissance philosophers invented syllogistic thinking, the scientific method, observation and
generalization, or any other fundamental method of rational thinking. Their contribution was,
more likely, to refine and systematize ways of thinking that are the common property of many
peoples. These ways of thinking appear to be more similar from one society to the next than what
scholars sometimes seem to realize. People of different times and different lands have dealt with
different kinds of problems, have possessed different bodies of knowledge, and have had varying
insights into the world that we all inhabit. Nonetheless, they all learn about that world, and
transmit their knowledge about the world, in ways that are often comparable to the ways in which
“modern” thinkers in the European tradition draw conclusions.
Perhaps the best statement is that of Blurton Jones and Konner (1976): “We have gained
little or nothing in ability or intellectual brilliance since the Stone Age; our gains have all been in
the accumulation of records of our intellectual achievements. . . . It is an error to equate the
documented history of intellectual achievement with a history of intellect” (p. 348). Logic is a

Is Modernism Really Modern?

14

tool for learning: both a tool for individual learning, and to convey new ideas to others. Learning
is fundamentally a method for dealing with the problem of changing environments (Lopreato,
1984, p. 74). This might lead us to think when one society is more technologically advanced than
another, this does not establish that one society is smarter than another or that its members reason
in different ways. Thus, the San should be perfectly capable of developing rocket ships, but their
traditions and environment instead lead them to excel at living from nature. It is likely that they
merely have a different stock of traditions on which to build, or that their environment poses
different practical problems for them to solve.
As long as we human beings all continue to inhabit the same planet, to have the same
nutritional and safety requirements, and to live in family groupings, we should expect to share
many methods of reasoning. Thus, although one should expect to find cultural variations in how
people make arguments, one should also expect to find many cross-cultural similarities.
MacIntyre‟s (1988) work gives us a much more solid foundation than most of the other
figures sometimes associated with the postmodernist movement. MacIntyre finds in the
Aristotelian tradition a way to seek rapprochement among competing traditions about rationality.
This does at least offer one possible way to seek common ground, and has the merit of
recognizing to at least some degree our common intellectual heritage.
The question of whether there are different ways of being rational loses its force when we
realize that, in the human condition as it is, people really may not differ all that greatly in
thinking, reasoning, and problem solving.
Whether it is possible to develop a sound theory of universal rationality is a protoypical
question of modern thought. In their efforts to discredit this attempt and expose what they see as
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its Euro-centric bias, postmodernists have exceeded the anthropological evidence. The origins of
human rationality may lie deep in the evolution of our species. The postmodernists have done the
world of scholarship a favor to point out the importance of tradition and culture in human
thought, but have, most likely, gone too far when they contend that methods of reasoning are
greatly different, even incommensurable, from one society to another.
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Notes
1

For example, see Willard (1989), Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci (1991); McKerrow (1991);

Stewart (1991); Brummett (1976).
2

A particularly good critique of the postmodernist conception of reasoning is Rowland

3

Hamill (1990) does note some variations in the Navajo‟s propositional logic, however,

(1995).

which he attributes to culturally variant conjoiners found in the Navajo language.
4

Thomas (1976) makes similar observation about the Gikwe San.

